Part 4 of Book on Al-Zarqawi and Second Generation of Al-Qa'ida Published

Part 4 ofSerialized Book: "Al-Zarqawi... The Second Generation of Al-Qa’ida" by Fu’ad Husayn, Jordanian Writer and Journalist

AL-QUDS AL-‘ARABI
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Al-Salafiyah is established on three major methodological foundations: Monotheism, adherence, and purification of one's heart. Monotheism is the backbone of religion. God sent his messengers to the universe to establish monotheism of lordship and worship in all kinds of rituals sanctioned by Him. These include seen rituals, such as praying, fasting, votive offering, slaughtering (of sheep), and circumambulation of the Ka'bah; and unseen rituals, such as fear, hope, love, trust, and request for assistance.

The following are the fundamentals of monotheism in Al-Salafiyah:

First: Belief in the attributes and names of God Almighty without distortion. A salafist believes in the attributes and names of God Almighty as mentioned in God's Book (the Koran) and the sayings of his messenger, prayers and peace be upon him.

Second: Worship of God Almighty alone. This not only means praying, paying alms, fasting, or performing the pilgrimage but it also implies everything meant by monotheism of worship. Foremost of all is invocation of God. No entity other than God shall be invoked regardless of whether such an entity is a messenger or a legitimate or alleged ruler. Kneeling, love, glorification, fear, slaughter, votive offering, and hope follow the invocation of God. All these issues are the right of God Almighty. Some people visit tombs to ask the dead for what should only be asked from God, such as healing the ill, achieving victory against the enemy, mediation with God, wealth, children, and fine living.

Third: Belief that God Almighty alone and no one else has the right to legislate for mankind. Legislation is the right of God Almighty. What is permissible is permitted by God alone and what is inadmissible is forbidden by Him solely. God and no one else sanctions the faith, methodology, and the way. Salafists believe that the majority of sultans and leaders nowadays challenge the legislation right of the Creator. They legalize what God prohibits and forbid what God permits. They draw up legislation different from God's under the pretext that God's rules do not accommodate the modern age, realize justice, equality, or freedom, or achieve pride and sovereignty.

Fourth: Al-Salafiyah believes that the aforementioned three fundamentals of monotheism are inseparable and can never be compromised since they are the cornerstone of understanding the right faith and the meaning of "there is no deity but God." A person who believes in one God believes that the Almighty is the one described in the Koran and the sayings of the messenger, prayers and peace be upon him. Faith in God should be in harmony with these attributes.
God Almighty alone should be invoked. All forms of worship should be for Him exclusively including slaughter, votive offering, fear, reverence, requests for assistance, trust, oath, glorification, and purification of the heart against everything that might harm monotheism. Faith and action should comply with the legislation of God. He rules the entire human race. There is no religion other than God's. God and no one else should be obeyed. In other words, no creature should be obeyed unless the Almighty says so. This creature, however, will not be obeyed if he contravenes God's commandments.

Al-Salafiyah adopts all these issues in unison to purify the hearts of its followers from polytheism. In the opinion of salafists, a person will not go to heaven if he invokes an entity other than God. They believe that distortion of the meanings of God's attributes and names is polytheism. A person who rules in contravention to God's shari'ah is an atheist. Someone who believes that a human being can draw up legislation for mankind in contravention of God's shari'ah is a polytheist. The three abovementioned issues are the cornerstone on which the first methodological foundation of Al-Salafiyah is established. They are the three conditions of monotheism. The foundation of monotheism will shake if one of these conditions is not met. This foundation is the basic introduction to Al-Salafiyah. Monotheism is the most important or rather the core issue of religion. Without it a Muslim is not considered a Muslim.

Adherence: When a follower of Al-Salafiyah is aware of monotheism in accordance with the aforementioned foundations, he should realize that he should adhere to the prophet, prayers and peace be upon him. There is no legislation and no religion other than what the messenger said in achievement of: "I testify that Muhammad is the messenger of God." This testimony can only be realized by the following:

First: A person should know that Muhammad, prayers and peace be upon him, is the messenger of God Almighty. He should learn that the messenger came with two revelations. The first is God's Book, the Koran, and the second is the Sunnah of the messenger, prayers and peace be upon him. The sayings of the messenger, prayers and peace be upon him, are similar to the sayings of God Almighty in belief and action. The messenger does not order, prohibit, or permit religious matters. He obeys God's commandments and says what God Almighty reveals to him.

Second: Religion is the methodology, way, and judgment. It is not merely cordial relations, as the majority of people predominantly think. This means that the prophet, prayers and peace be upon him, performs God's commandments. Defiance of the sayings of the messenger, prayers and peace be upon him, regarding commerce, marriage, divorce, governance, politics, and boundaries is defiance of issues of worship, including praying, fasting, paying alms, and performing the pilgrimage.

Third: In view of the two aforementioned issues, the status of the messenger, prayers and peace be upon him — in terms of absolute obedience — is unmatched. Thus, no other saying is approved whether it is by an imam, political leader, intellectual, or reformist if it contravenes the sayings of the messenger, prayers and peace be upon him. Otherwise, this will harm and violate the nation's unison, God's Book, and the sayings of the messenger, prayers and peace be upon him.

Purification of one's heart is purification of the soul in accordance with the divine methodology. This can only be done by observing the rituals, doing more supererogatory deeds, and adhering to God and His messenger. There is no worship other than what God stipulates and His messenger reiterates.

Purification of one's soul is one of the missions for which the messenger, prayers and peace be upon him, is sent. It is the ultimate message. God blessed us when he sent the prophet, prayers and peace be upon him, with the mission of reading God's verses. This is a great blessing since we listen to God's
words from a human being like us. The prophet purifies this nation when he reads what is revealed to him. He leads this nation out of the darkness of ignorance by teaching them the Book -- the Koran -- and offering them valuable knowledge.

According to salafists, Al-Salafiyah is not a call for one of the branches of faith or one issue of Islam. It is not a reformist, social, political, or partisan call. Rather, it is the call of Islam with all the meaning of this word, including pride, sovereignty, reform, justice, and success on earth and the hereafter. Salafists believe that Islam is God's religion for the universe. It is not the religion of a particular homeland or specific people. It is the religion of the entire world and peoples. Therefore, Al-Salafiyah is the sound methodology to understand and realize Islam.

Since Al-Salafiyah is not a religious or political party, its objectives are the objectives of propagating Islam. It is a methodology, call, and means to understand and apply Islam in everyday life. Accordingly, the objectives of Al-Salafiyah are summarized as follows:

First: Creating a genuine Muslim. The making of men in Al-Salafiyah is the duty of the Islamic call -- making Muslim men in the full sense of the word, humankind in the full sense of the word, and Muslim women in the full sense of the word. True Muslim men and women should meet the following conditions: Monotheism, adherence, and purification of the soul free of polytheism, fanaticism, superstition, and ignorance. The first mission of Al-Salafiyah is the mission of educating men after outlining the genuine understanding of Islam.

Second: Al-Salafiyah is the unification of Muslims under one faith and one legislative methodology to facilitate the establishment of one nation under one banner and one imam. God's word should prevail, and not the word of those who commit sins. A Muslim society should be built on the foundation of the faith and methodology of Islam free of polytheism, innovations, or profanity. A suitable environment should be provided to raise Muslim generations.

Third: God has the final say. Salafists believe that messengers are entrusted with alerting atheists and obstinate people and denying them excuses on the Day of Judgment. Followers of the messengers assumed this mission after the messengers went to meet their Maker. Their mission was to tell people what they should do to deny them any pretext on the Day of Judgment. The followers of the messenger, prayers and peace be upon him, succeeded him to perform his message. Jihad against the atheists, implementation of God's rules, invocation of God, and enlightening the human race are the missions of messengers. They are the duty of their followers.

A person follows the right path if he listens to this call. Thus, the third objective of the propagation of Islam is actually the first objective. A person should be denied excuses on the Day of Judgment. Al-Salafiyah, therefore, believes that all these branches meet with the main branch, which is showing Islam in its pure image throughout all ages. The moral fiber of Muslims should be distinguished until God inherits the world and everything on it.

Al-Salafiyah strives to reform politics and governance. It believes, however, that this is a less important priority. The efforts of those in charge of propagating Islam should deal with this issue accordingly. Al-Salafiyah prays for every virtuous sultan who seeks the well-being of people. It calls on all rulers to rule in accordance with God's shari'ah and salvage the Islamic world from the enemy of Islam who seeks to invade Muslim territories and tear them apart. Rulers should help Muslims establish their beloved nation.

Subsequently, Al-Salafiyah underscores monotheism of lordship and worship. Everything else follows
including reforming the system of government, politics, and the judiciary, cleansing society of corruption, and raising men and women in harmony with the true faith, rituals, and ethics.

Al-Zarqawi wrote several letters and speeches between 1994 and 2005. The first was his defense statement before the State Security Court in Jordan in 1994. It was the only one he made in Jordan. The rest of his letters and speeches were all published in Iraq. Al-Zarqawi did not write any speeches or letters when he was in Afghanistan. Seven years later, he delivered a speech called "Join the Team," which was his first speech in Iraq. Several speeches and letters followed.

We have chosen six of Al-Zarqawi's speeches and letters, including two written messages and four speeches that covered the whole period. The varied contents of the messages shed light on Al-Zarqawi's beliefs, way of thinking, and the development of his ideas and concerns. We analyzed Al-Zarqawi's written and audio speeches in an attempt to understand the nature of his Islamic and political address and the dogma on which he established his positions. We found mutual factors in his letters and speeches that highlighted his goals and strategy on the religious, political, and military fronts. The following are the most prominent features of his objectives:

Each of Al-Zarqawi's letters or speeches contained a large number of Koranic verses and prophetic sayings to prove that his methodology and tenets were right. He wanted to say that his religious group was guided by the holy Koran and Sunnah. He quoted the Koran and hadith frequently to support every idea or opinion that he conveyed to influence those whom he addressed in his letters and speeches. He established everything on the Koran and prophetic sayings and doings. He was not different from his Muslim peers or predecessors who used Koranic verses and prophetic sayings to support their ideas and beliefs. Thus, all his letters were flooded with quotations from the holy Koran, prophetic sayings, and the sayings of the companions and senior scholars who were more qualified and knowledgeable regarding adherence to God throughout the ages.

Al-Zarqawi's frequent citation of religious texts aimed to underscore the inevitability of the establishment of an Islamic state or caliphate. His recommendations to mujahidin clarified that the establishment of this state was a divine and certain promise. He urged his followers to pay no heed to hypocrites or highway robbers who maintained that they could not achieve what they wanted or that an Islamic caliphate or state would never be established since it was nothing more than a flight of the imagination. He recalled the Almighty's dictum: "Lo! The hypocrites say, and those in whose hearts is a disease: 'These people, -- their religion has misled them.' But if any trust in Allah, behold! Allah is exalted in might, wise." Al-Zarqawi told his supporters that God would help Muslims conquer Rome, as God's messenger, prayers and peace be upon him, mentioned in his hadith. He implored God to grant the mujahidin further victory when he said: "We pray God to conquer the White House, the Kremlin, and London. God's promise is with us." "Allah has promised, to those among you who believe and work righteous deeds, that He will, of a surety, grant them in the land, inheritance (of power), as He granted it to those before them." (Koranic verse).

Al-Zarqawi, however, believed that it was impossible to determine the date of the establishment of a caliphate or state. His mission, he said, was to do his best in favor of the faith to defend shari'ah. The outcome, he explained, would be determined by God Almighty. "A Muslim," he said, "has sold himself to God Almighty and therefore, he has one option only: to deliver himself to God. When the purchaser receives the merchandise, he can do whatever he wants. He can put him in jail, give him the best clothes to wear, or make him naked except for what will cover his genitals. He can make him rich or poor. He can hang him on a scaffold or let the enemy kill or mutilate him."
The Islamic state that Al-Zarqawi predicted would derive its legislation from God’s Book. Al-Zarqawi did not recognize any legislator other than God even if such a legislator was a scholar, ruler, member of parliament, or tribal chief. He considered everyone who acted in contravention of God’s shari’ah and in accordance with civil laws and constitutions as polytheists, as he put it in his defense statement during his trial. Al-Zarqawi said that the establishment of an Islamic state was imminent. The enemy, he said, could feel it. In his message to his nation, Al-Zarqawi said that the United States sent its fleets to the territory of Islam when it was terrified of the rising Islamic tide that called for jihad to exalt Islam.

Since Al-Zarqawi believed in the inevitability of the establishment of an Islamic state, he said that monotheism was its principal element. In all his speeches and letters, he underlined the importance of adherence to the values of the Islamic faith since it was the most trustworthy handhold and life saver for every human being.

Al-Zarqawi emphasized that monotheism not only meant observance of the rituals of Islam including praying, fasting, or paying alms, but it also meant recognition and trust in the Creator and not a ruler or official. In his opinion, all rulers were tyrants who incited people to breach Islamic rules, abandon honesty, and praise injustice and sins. Accordingly, Al-Zarqawi said that monotheism stipulated telling the truth about the nation’s tyrants and rulers regardless of the consequences since it would eventually gratify God. Therefore, Al-Zarqawi did not recognize all the civil laws and constitutions that were drawn up by governments. He viewed the Islamic shari’ah as an irreplaceable model that addressed every issue in life.

Al-Zarqawi believed that the establishment of an Islamic state required relentless effort. His entire speeches and messages were outright incitement for his followers in particular and the Islamic nation in general to play their revolutionary role in outlining the features of the current stage in which the Islamic nation faced grave challenges from the United States and the Zionist entity, or what he called the enemy of Islam. He believed that the confrontation between the West and Islam had many objectives, which the enemy wanted to achieve after it dreaded the rise of the Islamic call for jihad to exalt the word of Islam. Moreover, he said, such a confrontation "holds a deep-rooted grudge, historical enmity, and religious fanaticism that was nurtured by Torah prophecies against Muslims."

Al-Zarqawi’s incitement calls not only targeted the enemy of the Islamic nation but also Arab governments and regimes that he believed were nothing more than subservient entities for the West. Some of them, he said, supported and allied with Jews and Christians and helped them to usurp the holy sites and territories of Muslims.

Al-Zarqawi’s provocative calls targeted the Shiites in Iraq. More than once, he threatened that he would not leave the Shiites in peace until they stopped desecrating mosques and killing Sunnis. Al-Zarqawi did not believe that the Shiites were an Islamic sect. He said Shiism had no connection with Islam whatsoever. Al-Zarqawi put his ideas into practice. He claimed responsibility for the assassination of Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim, head of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq. Shaykh Yasin, the father of Al-Zarqawi’s second wife, detonated a booby-trapped ambulance near the tomb of Imam Ali Bin-Abu-Talib, God be pleased with him, in Al-Najaf. Al-Zarqawi claimed responsibility for other operations against Shiites in Karbala and Baghdad.

Incitement was mobilization followed by Al-Zarqawi’s call for jihad. In his recommendations to mujahidin, Al-Zarqawi intensified his call for jihad to obtain martyrdom for the cause of Islam. Jihad, he said, was the best on earth and in the hereafter. He said that a person would lose if he abandoned
jihad. He referred to the Almighty's dictum: "Say: Can you expect for us (any fate) other than one of two glorious things- (Martyrdom or victory)?" Al-Zarqawi explained that a mujahid would enjoy life if he survived and would go to heaven if he died or got killed. Al-Zarqawi quoted the following saying of the prophet, prayers and peace be upon him: "A martyr has six bounties: he will be forgiven with the first drop of his blood that is spilt; he will see his place in Paradise (at the time of death); he will be saved from the 'great horror' (on the Day of Judgment): a crown of dignity will be placed on his head, which contains many conundrums, each one being more precious than this life and all that it contains; he will have 72 women of paradise; and, he will be allowed to intercede for 70 of his family members (who would have otherwise gone to hell)." Al-Zarqawi also quoted the following hadith: "Paradise has 100 grades which Allah has reserved for the mujahidin who fight in His cause, and the distance between each two grades is like the distance between heaven and earth." This amounted to 50,000 years in paradise for the proponents of jihad.

Hence, Al-Zarqawi believed that his supporters and himself were lucky since God honored them with fighting infidels in Iraq and offered them an opportunity to defend Islam and retaliate for the enemy's oppression. Religion, he said, was protected by powerful men and never by those who lived in luxury, as he put it. "The great faith," he said, "was shouldered by great men."

In his recommendations to mujahidin, Al-Zarqawi said that victory for Muslims was imminent. He quoted the following Koranic verse: "Such was the practice (approved) of Allah among those who lived aforetime: No change wilt thou find in the practice (approved) of Allah." Al-Zarqawi said that God's victory might be deferred to an undisclosed time and might be accompanied by defeats and wounds among the ranks of Muslims. He believed that the losses sustained by mujahidin were normal and a must to achieve victory no matter what the price was. He said patience and endurance of hardships would achieve victory. Al-Zarqawi said he was confident of victory at the end of the day since God would keep his promise and support His soldiers.

Al-Zarqawi said that victory would not be accomplished if it were not accompanied by faith, honesty, and virtuous deeds. "There is no doubt; for Allah never fails in His promise." (Koranic verse). Muslims, he said, should have faith in God's will. They should know that he would test them. They should not look at the number and equipment of their enemy or forget God's promise. Al-Zarqawi quoted the following Koranic verses: "As to those who turn (for friendship) to Allah, His messenger, and the (fellowship of) believers, -- it is the fellowship of Allah that must certainly triumph." "And it was due for Us to aid those who believed." "Allah has promised to those among you who believe and work righteous deeds that He will of a surety grant them in the land, inheritance (of power), as He granted it to those before them; that He will establish in authority their religion - the one which He has chosen for them; and that He will change (their state), after the fear in which they (lived), to one of security and peace."

Al-Zarqawi blamed many scholars for abandoning their leading role in Islam that stipulated they should prompt Muslims to fight atheists and enlighten them about the dangers surrounding them. He said this stipulated that everyone should carry the banner of jihad in the cause of God against God's enemy. Scholars, he said, abandoned the field and withdrew from leading the masses. He said they found it difficult to sacrifice for the cause of God. "Scholars," Al-Zarqawi said, "blamed mujahidin for every shortcoming. Their voices are not heard except when they criticize mujahidin under the pretexts of politics or courtesy." Al-Zarqawi described it as the jurisprudence of defeat. He said the nation's scholars "were breastfed the milk of defeat. It runs in them. They will not change. They cover this reality with the cloak of jurisprudence and embroider it with the clothes of wisdom."
Al-Zarqawi said he was surprised at the position of some scholars who condemned the killing of Berg, the US hostage, who was beheaded by Al-Zarqawi. He said the scholars claimed that the operation tarnished the image of Islam in the West. "Some mediators," he said, "mediated to save this infidel. They offered to give us as much money as we would ask. Although we were in dire need of funds to pump in the body of jihad, we opted to take revenge for our fraternal brothers and nation."

He said, "The beheading was the revival of an old tradition and adherence to the practice of Rashidin caliphs. The merciful messenger, prayers and peace be upon him said: 'I have allowed slaughter.' Ruthless men of Quraysh feared him and began to appease him after they used to deride him." One can say that Al-Zarqawi disputed every idea that was opposed to his beliefs including the judgment as long as scholars did not lift a finger concerning the situation in Muslim countries including Iraq, Palestine, Afghanistan, Indonesia, and Chechnya. They did not do anything more than lamentation, peaceful protests, and condemnation.

In his letters and speeches, Al-Zarqawi listed the enemies targeted by jihad in light of both objective and subjective circumstances. He placed ruling regimes at the top of the list. Al-Zarqawi built his enmity toward Arab and Islamic regimes and governments on a number of factors including their disobedience of God's shari'ah and their acquiescence in the forces of atheism to do whatever they wanted. These regimes, he said, favored their temporary life to their life in the hereafter. Al-Zarqawi attacked his country's government in Jordan since "it kills people in the name of democracy, allows alcohol, adultery, and corruption, and views everyone who tells the truth as opposed to the state."

In his speech under "The Position Regarding Karzai's Government in Iraq," Al-Zarqawi attacked the US-installed interim government of Iyad Allawi. He said this government was formed to fool the world that the Iraqi experience had achieved success. He explained that the occupation authorities deceived the world by saying that they were able to form an Iraqi Government that represented the Iraqi people to reestablish law and order, rebuild the country, and pave the way for free and democratic elections in Iraq.

The government of Allawi, or Iraq's Karzai, as Al-Zarqawi put it -- in reference to the similarity between Allawi's government and the government of Hamid Karzai which the occupation forces installed in Afghanistan -- was a tool in the hands of the occupiers to seize the wealth of the nation. Al-Zarqawi did not discriminate between such a regime and the occupiers. He said: "We do not differentiate between an atheist foreigner and a polytheist Arab. We will sacrifice for the reestablishment of a caliphate on earth."

Al-Zarqawi threatened to kill Iraqi Prime Minister Iyad Allawi. He said that Allawi would face the fate of Izz-al-Din Salim, head of the interim Iraqi Governing Council, who was assassinated by Al-Zarqawi's supporters when they detonated a booby-trapped car that targeted his motorcade at the entrance of the Green Zone.

Al-Zarqawi's enmity toward the United States and Israel was very obvious since both countries represented the forces of atheism and oppression against justice. He said that he did not fear their number, weapons, or alliance with other forces of evil against Muslims. Rather, he said, he feared that Muslims would become weak of sins.

In his speech regarding his position vis-a-vis the government of Iraq's Karzai, Al-Zarqawi pointed out that the United States installed a satellite government to seize the resources of the nation by means of hypocrites. Experience, he said, proved to the United States that indirect colonialism was the best weapon against a nation. Al-Zarqawi said the United States thought the causes of the Islamic nation
were mere election chips to win the White House.

(Description of Source: London Al-Quds al-Arabi in Arabic -- London-based independent Arab nationalist daily with an anti-US and anti-Saudi editorial line; generally pro-Palestinian, tends to be sympathetic to Bin Ladin)

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Abu-Mus'ab al-Zarqawi went through important stages in his life. Some people who shared these stages with him held different views and abandoned him once and for all. Others who worked with him became his mentors, but he surpassed them. Some others who worked with him shared his same beliefs, but were separated from him in the aftermath of 11 September. We contacted a number of these people to draw a detailed picture of the development of Al-Zarqawi's character throughout various stages. We took notes of their impressions of and experience with Al-Zarqawi. We collected their testimonies, each of which addressed a certain period of time. We are publishing these testimonies in chronological order to shed light on the personality of Abu-Mus'ab al-Zarqawi.

The first person was Abu-al-Muntasir, an individual who enjoys freedom at the present time. Abu-al-Muntasir recalled his experience with Abu-Mus'ab al-Zarqawi as a story that blemished his life, even though it came to an end. The second was Abu-Muhammad al-Maqdisi, who came to know Al-Zarqawi in Afghanistan's battlefields, in jail, and elsewhere. Al-Maqdisi remains in prison in Jordan, where he is satisfied with his scholarly role. The third was Muhammad Makkawi, better known as Sayf al-Adl, without whom Al-Zarqawi would not have become affiliated with Al-Qa'ida, in view of his disagreement with Usama Bin Ladin. The farsightedness of Sayf al-Adl enabled him to weave a special relationship between Al-Zarqawi and Al-Qa'ida in 1999. Such a relationship produced the alliance of Al-Zarqawi and Bin Ladin in 2005. There is no doubt that this relationship will have its repercussions on the situation in the Middle East region and across the world. We leave these three testimonies in the hands of the readers, without interference in the content and without comment or clarification, since they are viewed as historical testimonies whose writers alone are responsible for their truth.

In August 1993, Sulayman Hamzah, a member of our Al-Da'wah and Al-Jihad Group, came to visit me with another member of the group, Sharif Abd-al-Fattah Jum'ah. Both men told me that a fraternal brother who came from Afghanistan wished to visit me after he learned about me from other fraternal brothers. I agreed. The next day, the two men came with Ahmad Fadil Nazzal al-Khalayilah, alias Abu-Mus'ab, and Khalid Mustafa al-Aruri, also known as Abu-al-Qassam. We discussed various issues for an hour, after which Abu-Mus'ab requested permission to leave. The other men left with him. While we were saying goodbye, he told me secretly that he would return the next day, God willing.

The next evening, Abu-Mus'ab came with Khalid al-Aruri, or Abu-al-Qassam. We talked about some previous experiences and events. Abu-Mus'ab was the main speaker. He frequently quoted
Abu-al-Qassam, who agreed by nodding his head, whispering yes, or saying some words to show his agreement. A few times, Abu-al-Qassam referred to one or two incidents to support what Abu-Mus'ab was saying. We were enjoying the conversation when Abu-Mus'ab interrupted by telling me: "My brother, I came to you today with my fraternal brother Abu-al-Qassam to meet together for the call of tawhid (monotheism in Islam). You are aware that the arena is in dire need for this methodology. We wish you could work with us for the cause of the faith and tawhid."

I replied: "It is my pleasure to meet with you to propagate God's faith on earth, to exalt God's word, and to bring down the word of the atheists."

Abu-Mus'ab said: "Then we are together. Many fraternal brothers who agree on the importance of obedience to God wish to meet you. God willing, things will be all right. The nature of our call will focus on propagating monotheism in Islam. I will introduce you to a knowledgeable brother who wrote books on tawhid. He would like to meet with us to propagate this call."

I said: "Who is this fraternal brother?"

Abu-Mus'ab said: "He is Abu-Muhammad al-Maqdisi. His real name is Isam Muhammad Tahir al-Barqawi."

When I heard the name, I immediately said: "I know him from a booklet he wrote that we used to distribute when we worked with Abu-Humam. The title of the book was (Millat Ibrahim)."

Abu-Mus'ab said: "Yes, he is the author of."

Abu-Mus'ab was enthusiastic, but extremely hasty. I told him: "My brother, Ahmad, this is not Afghanistan. The arena is completely different, and certainly, the method of propagation will be different. In view of my former experience with the Jaysh Muhammad, the matter requires profound and accurate understanding and considerable examination of the situation. It requires patience and an outstanding ability to choose our brothers to avoid falling into a trap."

Abu-Mus'ab said: "Everything is taken into consideration, God willing. We will choose the right people, God willing. What do you think, Abu-al-Qassam?"

Abu-al-Qassam said: "God willing, we are ready. Brother Abu-Mus'ab is right."

Abu-al-Qassam was very devoted to Ahmad. He never disagreed with him, regardless of the consequences. May God release him from captivity.

I said: "Abu-Mus'ab, can you identify the goals and framework of our action?"

Abu-Mus'ab: "The most important goal is to propagate the call of tawhid."

From Abu-Mus'ab's standpoint, tawhid means monotheism of governance in Islam. It is viewed as the most important feature of the tawhid of Lordship. The monotheism call that we seek to propagate stipulates the enforcement of God's shari'ah and the announcement that the regimes, laws, and constitutions that are drawn up by mankind are atheist, regardless whether these regimes were democratic or undemocratic.

Abu-Mus'ab continued: "We have a group of shari'ah messages that are exclusive to our call. We have to work vigorously to prevent people from participating in the forthcoming parliamentary elections.
particularly that the Islamic movement -- the Muslim Brotherhood -- is in favor of taking part in these atheist elections. God willing, we will drive them back to where they came from."

I said: "Could you mention some of these messages to me?"

Abu-Mus'ab said: "There is, an audiotape, and a published message written by Abu-Talal al-Qasimi, a member of the Islamic movement in Algeria, concerning the illegitimacy of democratic elections. There are lessons of tawhid that you and brother Abu-Muhammad al-Maqdisi will give to the brothers."

I said: "Is there anything else, Abu-Mus'ab?"

Abu-Mus'ab said: "Yes."

He proposed some ideas. I had reservations, however, and I told him: "We are at the beginning of the way. We need to be patient until we become strong and then we can do things, God willing."

Abu-Mus'ab said: "God willing, we will take everything into consideration. We have faith in God."

Abu-al-Qassam said: "Do not worry. We will take everything into consideration, as Abu-Mus'ab said. We have faith in God."

I wanted to test the personality of both men, and therefore I said: "My brothers, it is not what you think. If Jordanian intelligence captures you, we will be in trouble. No one knows about Jordanian intelligence like those who tasted their treatment. We have to be very careful. God Almighty alone can save a person from the hands of the intelligence service."

Abu-Mus'ab said: "It will be all right, brother, God willing. They are nothing more than atoms to God."

Abu-al-Qassam said: "Yes, they are nothing more than atoms to God, as Abu-Mus'ab put it."

Abu-Mus'ab said: "My brother, are you willing to agree with us?"

I said: "Yes, we have faith in God."

Abu-Mus'ab said: "Give us your support, and we will entrust you to be our amir. You are eligible to be one, God willing."

I said: "Wait, brothers. Although the amirship is sanctioned by God, I have no desire to become an amir. You can appoint someone else."

Abu-Mus'ab said: "No, you will be the amir, God willing."

Abu-al-Qassam said: "Yes, you will be the amir."

I said: "No, I do not wish to be one. I wish you would stop saying that. I think it is better if we do not have these sorts of titles, since we have done nothing so far. Otherwise, let Abu-Mus'ab be the amir for the time being."

Abu-Mus'ab, however, insisted on the amirship issue. We agreed to go to Abu-Muhammad al-Maqdisi
the next morning.

The next day, Abu-Mus'ab and Abu-al-Qassam came and accompanied me to Abu-Muhammad al-Maqdisi's home in the Al-Rashid neighborhood in the city of Al-Rusayfah. Abu-Mus'ab briefed Al-Maqdisi on our discussion of the previous day. He said: "We are together now, and we would like to clarify the amirship issue." We agreed that Abu-Muhammad al-Maqdisi would be the amir of the da'wah wing and Abu-Mus'ab the amir of the group. In their opinion, Abu-al-Qassam and myself will be the influential people of the group. During this session, we redistributed the roles of the da'wah action and initiated what we would be doing over the next days. The most important step we agreed on was the prompt publication of all shari'ah messages that dealt with the illegitimacy of democratic or parliamentary elections. We wanted to prevent the 1993 parliamentary elections that were scheduled to take place a few months later. We exerted further personal and collective efforts to clarify the shari'ah rule regarding governance. We decided to oppose everyone who issued a fatwa to dispute our stand.

Several days after this meeting, Ahmad Fadil -- Abu-Mus'ab -- and Khalid al-Aruri -- Abu-al-Qassam -- visited me. They were carrying a burlap bag. Abu-Mus'ab said: "I brought some hand grenades in this bag. They belong to Abu-Muhammad al-Maqdisi. He brought them with him from Kuwait after Saddam Husayn entered the country. He smuggled them in the van that transported his furniture. He has been hiding them at his home since then. He gave them to me to put them in a safer place."

I was surprised. I did not expect such a thing, let alone the haste. I fully realized that the possession of weapons meant the end of da'wah and its proponents. It was haste and recklessness. I was definitely aware that the state would not mind anything as much as it would mind such issues. No matter how substantial or dangerous an issue was, the regime would view it as trivial compared with the issue of weapons and explosive devices. The state was lying in wait to find the da'wah proponents guilty. Consequently, I adopted a firm stance. Following a discussion, Abu-Mus'ab changed his mind. He took the bag and left with Abu-al-Qassam.

Pro-da'wah and pro-tawhid action went on for months, but without a clear hierarchy or even a name for the group. Many young men who were fellow members of the Al-Da'wah and Al-Jihad Group agreed with us concerning our ideology. The Al-Da'wah and Al-Jihad Group ceased to exist, even though its objectives were more defined than this group's. The young men who joined us included Talal al-Badawi, alias Abu-al-Bara, who separated from the group after his release from jail. Al-Badawi established an ultra-fundamentalist movement.

The hastiness of brother Abu-Mus'ab was a problem for me. He wanted everything to be done quickly. He wanted to achieve all of his ambitions in a matter of months, if not hours. Such haste posed one of the most dangerous threats to our call. Abu-Mus'ab made decisions unilaterally at the wrong time and place. More tragically, the majority of brothers used to agree with him.

I admired Abu-Mus'ab for his sincerity, but at the same time I was afraid of his over-enthusiasm. I told him that action in the Jordanian arena was almost impossible. First and foremost, I was worried that the intelligence service would infiltrate our group. One day, he came to tell me that Abu-Muhammad al-Maqdisi was giving lessons at gathering places. He said that Abu-Muhammad was giving a lesson on Al-Wasitiyyah (Al-Wasitiyyah is a religious study written by Ibn-Taymiyyah for a group of religious intellectuals in Wasit (Iraq) before the arrival of the Mongols in Damascus) at the home of Nafiz Fayiz. I went to Fayiz's home, and I was horrified by what I saw. Al-Maqdisi was surrounded by 15 people. I left immediately. I did not stay, since I did not like the situation or some people there. It
appeared to me that the meeting was infiltrated. In light of my former experience with the Al-Da'wah and Al-Jihad Group, I thought it would be better if these lessons were given at a mosque and not at gathering places. I was afraid of undesirable security repercussions, which actually happened.

Some people took advantage of the way I left the meeting and tried to drive a wedge between Abu-Mus'ab and me. We did not see each other for more than two months. Suddenly, Abu-Mus'ab came back to me. I welcomed him, and after he calmed down he told me that he was being hunted, along with a number of brothers, including Abu-al-Qassam, Al-Maqdisi, Abd-al-Hadi, and Sulayman Hamzah. Yes, they were hunted by the intelligence. Abu-Mus'ab said he could not find a safer haven than my home. I welcomed him and said I was ready to forget what had happened. I agreed to support them. Abu-Mus'ab was accompanied by Nasri Izz-al-Din al-Tahayinah. I asked Abu-Mus'ab if he trusted him. He said he was a trustworthy fraternal brother. I told him I was worried that he would not withstand the intelligence service. He told me it was just the opposite. They remained in hiding at my home for more than four months.

Toward the end of Ramadan 1414 of the Hegira, corresponding to the beginning of March 1994, I went on a trip with two friends to perform the minor pilgrimage. A fight erupted between the two men and an intelligence officer. As a result, we were arrested at the border on our return from the trip. We were taken into custody at the General Intelligence Department in the Amman neighborhood of Al-Abdali. In the evening, an interrogator summoned me and told me that I was detained as a result of the brothers' problem with the intelligence man at the border. I told him it was merely a quarrel between two people. The interrogator asked me about Ahmad Fadil al-Khalayilah. He also asked me about Isam Tahir al-Barqawi. I denied that I knew any of them. The interrogation lasted for 12 days. On my fifth day in detention, a representative of the Red Cross visited me. I gave him a letter to deliver to my wife and parents, telling them that I was detained at the General Intelligence Department. When Abu-Mus'ab, Abu-Muhammad, and other brothers learned of this, they left the house for safer places.

On the last day of March, after 2000 (local time), the interrogator summoned me and wrote down my final affidavit. He told me that he would release me the next morning. I returned to my cell feeling happy that I would leave. My cell was facing the main gate to the prison. It allowed me to see who was coming in or out. I was shocked to see Ahmad Fadil al-Khalayilah held by a big intelligence guard. There was a group of men with Abu-Mus'ab, including Nasri al-Tahayinah. This was unanticipated. I hoped that Abu-Mus'ab and Nasri would not say anything about me. Twenty minutes later, however, the blow occurred. One of the guards in charge of torture came running toward the cell, asking for me. He pulled me by the hand and took me to the torture yard. At the entrance to the yard, I saw Nasri al-Tahayinah, who was apparently beaten a bit. He was asked: "Is he the man?" He said: "Yes." I was taken into the torture yard. God knew what happened.

Later, they handcuffed me and covered my eyes. They took me home to see whether Al-Maqdisi was there. When they did not find anyone, they took me back to the General Intelligence Department. They put me, Ahmad Fadil, and Abu-al-Qassam in solitary confinement in another, underground building. We were deprived of sleep for 15 nights. They wanted me to confess about the explosive devices that the brothers possessed. I told them I was against these issues. I told them that I refused to take the weapons. They believed me. Abu-Muhammad al-Maqdisi was arrested a few days later. I learned afterward, via a close aide who rented an apartment for him in Amman, where he lived with Nasri, that Abu-Mus'ab had been detained. As for Abu-Muhammad al-Maqdisi, he handed himself over in exchange for the release of his brothers, who had been taken into custody.
During the torture period, the Red Cross was supposed to visit the intelligence prison on a certain day. We were taken away to the roof of one of the general intelligence buildings to hide us from the Red Cross. We stayed there from morning until late afternoon. Afterward, they took us back to our cells to torture us again. That day, I was with Abu-Mus'ab, Abu-al-Qassam, and other brothers.

After that, we were taken from the general intelligence prison in the old building in Al-Abdali to the general intelligence prison at the new premises in Al-Jandawil neighborhood in the Amman district of Bayadir Wadi al-Sir. We remained in custody until September 1994. During that time, we used to hear each other calling "God is Great" or "God is our Lord. You have no Lord." Everyone, including Abu-Muhammad, Abu-Mus'ab, myself, Abd-al-Hadi, and others used to say such expressions. We used to watch each other when we were let out in the yard. Things remained the same until the end of the month, when everyone was released, except for 14 (figure as published) people whom the General Intelligence Department said should be tried by the prosecutor general. The defendants were:

1. Isam Muhammad Tahir Muhammad, better known as Abu-Muhammad al-Maqdisi;
2. Ahmad Fadil Nazzal, alias Abu-Mus'ab;
3. Mustafa Hasan Musa;
4. Khalid Mustafa al-Aruri, also known as Abu-al-Qassam;
5. Sulayman Talib Ahmad Hamzah, alias Abu-al-Mu'tasim;
6. Muhammad Wasfi Umar Abu-Khalil;
7. Nasri Izz-al-Din Muhammad al-Tahayinah, also known as Abu-al-Izz;
9. Sharif Ibrahim Abd-al-Fattah Jum'ah;
10. Ahmad Abdallah Yusuf al-Zaytawi;
11. Muhammad Abd-al-Karim Ahmad al-Rawashidah;
12. Muhammad Fakhri Musa al-Salih;
13. Ala-al-Din Atif;
14. Sa'adat Abd-al-Jawad;
15. Talal Kayid al-Badawi;
16. Abd-al-Majid al-Majali, also known as Abu-Qutaybah.

Before and during detention, the brothers' capabilities were very humble. Weak planning and infiltration were evident. I wished that the da'wah period had lasted longer to enhance the knowledge of the young men, since most of them were uneducated. Moreover, there was a need to foster the da'wah and find a suitable foundation to protect and support it. However, it was God's will. Following the detention period at the General Intelligence Department and the severity of the torture to which
some brothers were exposed -- which made them tougher and more defiant -- the shortcomings of the action prior to the detention became a major lesson to learn.

On the last day of our detention in the intelligence cells -- where most of us were held for at least seven to nine months -- we were transferred to the Suwaqah Prison, located more than 80 kilometers south of Amman. A senior officer at the prison asked us to take off our clothes before we entered our rooms. We looked at each other, and I said: "We will not take off our clothes. No one is going to see our genitals." The brothers supported me, and we all refused to take off our clothes. I knew they were trying to rub our nose in the dirt. Therefore, we refused. Why did they insist on searching us, when we were coming from the General Intelligence, the most dangerous and authoritarian security department? What could we hide? Eventually, they searched us with our clothes on. We were led into the prison and put in a room that held the whole group. I remember it was room 204. Neither Abu-Mus'ab, nor Al-Maqdisi were with us then.

The first step we took was making a decision regarding the amirship of the group. It was important to install an amir to handle our affairs with the administration. Some brothers suggested that I become an amir. Some others nominated Abu-Quaybah, but he refused. Finally, Nabil Abu-Harithiyah, alias Abu-Mujahid, was chosen, since he spent years in prison in connection with the Jaysh Muhammad case. I was selected as the official spokesman for the group to handle issues with the administration of the prison, with or without the amir. A rough stage began during which we fostered a new status quo in the prison. We had our prestige when dealing with the prison administration and guards, but it was not without grave sacrifices.

In the meantime, we followed the news of our brothers in various prisons until the first month of 1995, when a second stage began. Abu-Mus'ab arrived at the Suwaqah Prison with another Islamist who was detained separately on charges of possessing explosive devices and opening fire on an intelligence officer. The name of the man was Mahmud Kharyush, also known as Abu-Ubaydah. The prison administration put both men in a ward far from ours, but they sat with us that day. The next day, Abu-Mus'ab came to us without Abu-Ubaydah, since the prison administration did not allow him to come. We were reunited after a bitter struggle, particularly after the arrival of Abu-Muhammad al-Maqdisi. A month later, however, problems arose with the prison administration, and we were sent to various prisons across the Kingdom. Abu-Muhammad al-Maqdisi, Mustafa Hasan, Nabil Abu-Harithiyah, Muhammad Salih Musa, and myself were taken to Ma'an Prison, 220 kilometers south of the capital of Amman. Abu-Mus'ab and another group were taken to the Qafqafa Prison. Other groups were taken to the prisons of Birin and Al-Juwaydah. Instead of dealing with our problem at one prison, there was an unsolvable problem in each of the prisons. Everyone was making his own judgment. Four months after being separated in different jails, we were taken back to the Suwaqah Prison in April 1995. We were given a ward to share with the Islamists. Another phase began.

The prison's administration used to call us the Al-Takfir (Excommunication) Group. One of the brothers asked me what we should answer when they called us by this name. I told them: "Tell them we are not the Al-Takfir Group. We are the Al-Tawhid group. Not only this, we are the group of Al-Tawhid and Al-Jihad." Thus, the group was later known as Al-Tawhid and Al-Jihad.

We were together with the Al-Tahir (Liberation) Group in the ward. A group of Jordanian Afghans were in the opposite ward. Some of them joined us, and so did other Islamist who were imprisoned on individual charges. Another new group under the name of the Al-Tajdid al-Islami (Islamic Renewal) group joined us, as well.
The amirship issue began to surface again. Isam al-Barqawi was chosen as amir of the group. However, the way he dealt with the administration concerning our causes did not win the admiration of many of the brothers, including myself, Ahmad Fadil, and Abdallah Hashayikah. Several months later, the amirship went to Ahmad Fadil. I felt that Ahmad Fadil was acting in favor of his emirate. I also felt that Al-Maqdisi was acting in favor of his shaykhdom to win a title. I felt that the writings of Al-Maqdisi were not purely for God, but for fame, since he wanted everyone to say that he wrote or said something. Subsequent events prompted me to separate from both men and, consequently, from the entire group. However, I supported them in court until the sentences were issued, and I defended their outspoken hostility to the jury.

During the time in prison, a number of martyrdom-seeking operations took place in Palestine. The military wing of the Islamic Resistance Movement, HAMAS, carried out these operations. Some fraternal brothers in the prison and elsewhere asked for the opinion of Al-Maqdisi vis-a-vis the legitimacy or illegitimacy of these operations. Al-Maqdisi maintained that such operations were forbidden since they were tantamount to committing suicide. I argued with him and provided evidence from the shari'ah. I told him that these operations were legitimate. However, he refused what I said. Ahmad Fadil, alias Abu-Mus'ab, supported him, since he viewed Abu-Muhammad al-Maqdisi as his shaykh, scholar, and mufti. Al-Maqdisi issued a fatwa announcing that these operations where forbidden. Many people in the prison disagreed with him, including Al-Tajdid Group and engineer Ata Abu-al-Rishtah, who was then the official spokesman of the Al-Tahrir Group. Al-Maqdisi was confused, and therefore he issued a fatwa called "la'am" -- a combination of la (no) and na'am (yes).

I refuted Al-Maqdisi's fatwa. I published a letter in which I referred to shari'ah evidence that showed the legitimacy of such operations. In the letter, I pointed out that the person who carried out such an operation was the best martyr after a man who stood in front of a tyrant imam, rebuked him, and killed him. I said that the latter was the master of martyrs, followed by the person who carried out the martyrdom-seeking operation. God knows best. I published this fatwa in prison and elsewhere in response to Al-Maqdisi's position.

A week after I was acquitted, the moment came for my release. The acquittal was announced after four years behind bars. What kind of justice was that? What did I reap from four years in prison? I ask God Almighty to consider them as my good deeds on Judgment Day. "(It will be) the Day when no soul shall have power (to do) aught for another: For the command, that Day, will be (wholly) with Allah." (Koranic verse).

The acquittal letter was issued and the prison's administration asked me and Nasri al-Tahayinah to get ready to return from where we came. Abu-Mus'ab came to say goodbye. He told me: "Let us forget the past. Let us be together in the future, God willing." I said: "God willing."

Two years after my release, King Husayn Bin-Talal died. The rest of the brothers were released from prison following a general amnesty issued by King Abdallah II, King Husayn's son. When Abu-Mus'ab got out of jail, he visited me at home and asked me to open a new chapter with him, work together, and perhaps travel to Afghanistan. I welcomed him as a guest, but I refused to work with him again in any way in view of his narcissism, not to mention other traits. Abu-Mus'ab left my house and never came back again. It was the last contact between us.

(Description of Source: London Al-Quds al-Arabi in Arabic -- London-based independent Arab nationalist daily with an anti-US and anti-Saudi editorial line; generally pro-Palestinian, tends to be sympathetic to Bin Ladin)
Sixth Part of Serialized Book on Al-Zarqawi and Al-Qa'ida Published
Part 6 of serialized book: "Al-Zarqawi... The Second Generation of Al-Qa'ida" by Fu'ad Husayn, Jordanian writer and journalist
AL-QUDS AL-'ARABI
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Journal Code: 1430 Language: ENGLISH Record Type: FULLTEXT
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Isam Tahir al-Barqawi, better known as Abu-Muhammad al-Maqdisi, wrote a document in September 2004 about his knowledge of Al-Zarqawi and opinion regarding Al-Zarqawi's current acts in Iraq. We are publishing this document verbatim:

Praise be to God, the Lord of the universe. Prayers and peace be upon the commander of mujahidin (Prophet Muhammad), his family, and honorable companions.

I first met Abu-Mus'ab (Al-Zarqawi) in Peshawar. We met briefly at the home of Abu-al-Walid al-Ansari, may God protect him. That was in the early 1990s. I did not know Al-Zarqawi before, because I was a newcomer to Jordan. When Al-Zarqawi returned from Afghanistan, he visited me at my home and expressed enthusiasm in support of tawhid and propagating the faith. Abu-al-Walid was the one who gave him my address in Jordan. He advised him to contact me if he wanted to work on behalf of religion in Jordan. This was almost 14 years ago.

We cooperated together in this field. I organized lessons in various parts of the country. We printed out some of my books and disseminated them among the people. Young men rallied around our call and circulated our books and messages. However, the security services became aware and stormed our homes at different times. The manhunt began, and we were arrested, one after the other. We were held in custody in the cells of the General Intelligence Department for different periods of time, the minimum of which was six months. The detention became the first experience against God's enemy in this country. I opted to come out openly with the truth and avoid fear. I faced them and told them straightforwardly that they were atheists and that their masters and tyrants in the cells and interrogation centers were atheists. I was together with Abu-Mus'ab and a number of young men who were influenced by my call and writings.

Before the trials, we were taken from solitary confinement to other prisons. Since I was classified as the primary defendant, I was isolated in a prison in the north of the country. Abu-Mus'ab, the second defendant, was taken to a prison in central Jordan, and the other fraternal brothers were all taken to a prison in the south. A month later, they gathered us all in one prison in the south -- the Suwaqah Prison. The brothers chose me as their amir, a position I held for almost a year, after which I realized it was taking too much of my time. Therefore, I opted to dedicate my time to writing books and giving lessons, particularly because this group of young men who shared our suffering in jail were new to the call and in dire need to understand Islamic jurisprudence. After I convinced the majority of young men, I decided to abandon the amirship and to appoint Abu-Mus'ab as my successor. Some insensible writers tried to portray the issue as a dispute over the amirship, as if it was an emirate or a state. It was
a confined emirate in prison to address the brothers' concerns and unify our policy vis-a-vis the prison's administration. The maximum number of members of this emirate was 30. During most of our periods of imprisonment, they did not exceed 15.

I did not abandon Abu-Mus'ab after I entrusted him to become an amir. I stood beside him in the face of the enemy. I took care of sermons on Fridays and holidays. I gave lessons to the young men and provided Abu-Mus'ab with counsel. I supported him against some of those who disputed his amirship, and I spared no effort to give him help and advice, since he asked me to do that before he succeeded me as amir. He also stood by my side in propagating the faith. He was compliant and enthusiastic about everything I wrote in support of tawhida and the renunciation of polytheism. We were in agreement concerning the foundations of the Islamic jurisprudence. We shared the same niche. He admired my writings and supported them. He urged every young man whom he knew in jail and elsewhere to photocopy, read, and circulate them. Thanks to God, the stage of trials passed, and we employed them successfully on behalf of our call, the excommunication of the regime, and the denunciation of its laws. We announced this outspokenly from the prisoner's dock in front of journalists and others in the audience. I prepared bill of indictment against the president of the court, his tyrants, and the state. I read it out to him when he asked me: "Guilty or not guilty?" Together with my brothers, we said: "You are guilty. You forestalled God's shari'a and ruled in contravention of God's rules. You allied with the Jews and fought the mujahidin and proponents of tawhida." In the indictment, which I called the trial of the State Security Court and its jury in harmony with God's shari'a, I provided him with evidence of his atheism and the atheism of his regime. I declared that my brothers and myself did not believe in their courts, laws, idols, or state. Abu-Mus'ab and the other defendants were present and took part in it all. It cooled their eyes and boosted their spirits. They felt the blessing of our call and rejoiced in the fruits we harvested every day we were in prison. The enemy wanted to silence this call, but the sorcery turned against the sorcerer. The prison and the trials became a podium from where we propagated our ideology. Thanks to God, the dilemma became a reward.

"Then they sought a stratagem against him: but We made them the ones who lost the most!" (Koranic verse)

These were blessed days, during which we strived to propagate the faith in jail among the soldiers, officers, officials who used to visit the prison sometimes, and inmates who circulated my books. They used to pray with us and attend my sermons on Fridays and holidays. God helped me, and I wrote many books during my term in prison. Praise be to God Almighty. The good seeds were sown everywhere. I ask God Almighty to accept them and reward me on Judgment Day.

The regime sensed the danger of this call among the prisoners. They became afraid that it would spread from behind the bars. They were concerned that my writings would be published, even though I was locked up. Therefore, they tried to isolate us from the other inmates. They prevented them from praying with us. Everyone who used to talk to us or even shake hands with us was punished. They isolated us in special wards where no one was allowed to enter. They relocated us from one prison to another, the last of which was the Al-Jafr desert prison, where they tried to isolate us from the entire world. However, they did not succeed. Every time they did that, they brought us closer to the people and facilitated our contact with a large number of young men. When they transferred us to the Al-Salt Prison, they made it easier for the young men of Al-Salt city to visit us, instead of traveling the long distance to the Suwaqah Prison. The relocation facilitated our communication with them. When they moved us to the Al-Jafr Prison, they brought us closer to the city of Ma'an and facilitated our contact with our brothers who introduced us to new people in Ma'an. Whenever they closed a door, God
opened new doors everywhere. We were able to publish books and obtain useful references. "And (the unbelievers) plotted and planned, and God, too, planned, and the best of planners is God." (Koranic verse) This was our situation with them the whole time. Without knowing it, they were tightening the noose, but God was freeing us.

Thanks to God, this was always the case. They sent me to prison every year or two, without guilt other than declaring my faith, tawhid, and call, in which I mainly announced the excommunication of tyrants, incited young men against their masters, and supported mujahidin against Americans everywhere. This was my crime, for which I was taken to prison every now and then. They thought that the jail would undermine our ideology. They were too stupid to know that jail and suffering would intensify our call. God Almighty made the prison one of the stages during which we learned and at the same time educated others. If they had known that we would achieve victory, they would not have held us in custody for one minute. Praise be to God for His generosity and blessings. "Fain would they extinguish God's light with their mouths, but God will not allow but that His light should be perfected, even though the Unbelievers may detest (it)." (Koranic verse) We were set free, thank God. I opted to stay in the country to take care of the call we initiated. I hope I will convey it west of the Jordan River, where I have hopes and ambitions.

Abu-Mus'ab opted to leave all this and travel to Afghanistan. I was not happy, because I had reservations regarding the situation there. However, he was enthusiastic, and he urged everyone he knew to go to Afghanistan. It was not only sorrowful to see Abu-Mus'ab emptying the arena from pro-tawhid men, but it was also painful to see Abu-Abd-al-Rahman -- Ra'id Khuraysat -- leaving with another group of young men from Al-Salt to Afghanistan and then to Kurdistan, where he was killed with a group of brothers while fighting the Kurdish Northern Alliance. Abu-Abd-al-Rahman had taken strides in propagating our call and establishing training camps.

Abu-Abd-al-Rahman's endeavors were amazing. The man was a pioneer in the field of propagating our ideology, a beacon for young men, and a thorn in the side of heretics. As for Abu-Mus'ab, he used to tell everyone who blamed him for emigrating from his country that he was a man who loved jihad and had no patience to learn, teach, or propagate the faith. He accompanied a number of young men to Afghanistan, where they took advantage of the circumstances of the country and its camps. All this, however, was obvious to our country's intelligence as a result of fatal organizational defects. It hurt me to see that, but I tried hard to advise them whenever I could.

I learned that Abu-Mus'ab and his group of young men abstained from fighting alongside the Taliban when they experienced events, some of which I had reservations against. These events discouraged me from traveling to Afghanistan. I knew these things before, without going all the distance to witness them. These events were circulated by the media. We learned of some of them via the radio before we were released. Nevertheless, enthusiasm to escape the pressure of the enemy prompted them to close their eyes to these things. Later, however, I did not know what prompted them to refrain from fighting alongside the Taliban, although they should have.

I followed the news of the brothers, including their detention, relocation, or return to Jordan. I felt sorry for the dispersion of their efforts and capabilities in various countries, including Afghanistan, Kurdistan, Pakistan, Iran, and Iraq. A group of them were detained in Pakistan, another group in Iran, and a third in Kurdistan and Iraq. I felt sorry for them for working without a clear program and hopping from one region to another, depending on different circumstances and not on a defined or pre-planned strategy.
I used to follow the news of how the intelligence in Jordan received a flood of information from the returnees, which saved the intelligence tremendous efforts to send spies to every country. The intelligence learned about the exact details about the young men, including their activities, camps, places of residence, addresses, and new aliases in both Afghanistan and Kurdistan. I was shocked whenever the intelligence told me such detailed information. I tried to hide the news of the young men as much as I could. During interrogation, I heard detailed information about the young men for the first time. When I was released, I found out that the information was correct. It was not cleverness on the part of the intelligence or knowledge of the supernatural. Instead, it was organizational weakness and fatal security negligence on the part of the young men.

I advised some men and sent messages to them. This caused me so much harm from the enemy and others that God alone knew about. I endured all that to protect my brothers, their efforts, and their capabilities. I was afraid that the enemy would abort these efforts. It was painful to see that the young men were dealing with organizational and military issues superficially. The lack of experience foiled several attempts by Abu-Mus'ab and frustrated the organizational action that he attempted to establish in Jordan. Subsequently, these unsuccessful attempts resulted in the imprisonment of many young men. Some of them were sentenced to life in prison on charges of involvement in three attempts. In the last two experiences, the enemy won huge funds that Muslims, their call, and jihad needed badly. I used to follow their news and give them advice, but they never listened until it was too late.

It was sad to know that these organizational mistakes and security weaknesses took place again in Afghanistan. Abu-Mus'ab did not learn from our experiences at home. He was not successful in choosing the right individuals with organizational expertise, despite the availability of financial resources. I felt sorry to see the enemy confiscating all these resources when each action was aborted. Those concerned did not invest these resources in an action that would help the nation or jihad. They did not take into consideration the necessary security precautions that would accommodate their ambitions. This was not guesswork. I experienced these events whenever the attempts were aborted. I examined the situation of the advocates of these acts and their uncertainty. When I was in jail with them, I advised them to be cautious of certain things that I anticipated, but they did not listen. Very often, I was taken to jail as a result of such advice or as a result of the possession of those young men of my writings. Some of them confessed that they knew me although I had no organizational affiliation with them. The young men did not inform me of any of these events, but I anticipated the outcome in view of my experience in the field of propagation. They did not heed my advice. They took shelter under my name, writings, and "shaykhdom." I would have not worried if their action had been accurate. However, there is no need to mention details here.

In the aftermath of the downfall of Afghanistan's regime, the fraternal young men were scattered across Pakistan and Iran. Some of them were detained in Pakistan and Iran. Some others were killed in Afghanistan at the hands of the proxy Northern Alliance. Abu-Mus'ab went to Kurdistan, which was not on his itinerary one day. He did not agree with Shaykh Ra'id Khuraysat, may his soul rest in heaven. Abu-Abd-al-Rahman (Khuraysat) had settled in Kurdistan already, where he established camps and trained many men. He had a significant influence there, but he was killed with a group of young men during confrontations with the proxy Kurdish Northern Alliance. May their souls rest in heaven.

The remnants of the men rallied around Abu-Mus'ab. Some of them had good military experience, especially in the field of making explosive devices. These young men helped Abu-Mus'ab in Iraq after many of his men in Afghanistan were killed, detained, or hunted in Pakistan, Iran, and Jordan. Other men from Jordan and elsewhere joined Abu-Mus'ab, including Abu-Anas al-Shami. I rejoiced at the
news, since I knew that Abu-Mus'ab was in dire need of someone who would remind him to be cautious amid such complicated circumstances in Iraq and the all-out war against him and every mujahid. This prompted me to write these words.

Thanks to God, the experiences shaped me, and the days taught me to refrain from over-enthusiasm or slackness and to maintain my balance whenever I could. I forward these words to my brother Abu-Mus'ab, and I announce it loud and clear that I support him against his enemies, their masters, evil scholars, and lackeys. I forward these words to him to advise and remind him and other mujahidin. I will be happy if he heeds my advice and invigorates my hopes, and I will be sad if he does not. However, I would have done my duty toward him and other fraternal mujahidin.

I begin by reiterating what I have already said. I believe that Abu-Mus'ab al-Zarqawi is a proponent of the ahl al-sunnah wa al-jama'ah (Sunnis). He supports our tenets concerning tawhid, Abraham's Children, and the excommunication of tyrants and their supporters. Like us, he discriminates between supporters of those whom we excommunicate who share their atheism and hostility against pro-tawhid men, on one side, and others who might help them carry out a forbidden act or flatter them for committing a wrongdoing that is not viewed as atheism, on the other. We do not excommunicate the latter, and he does not do that, either. His faith and ours is the faith of Sunnis. We do not excommunicate a Muslim for some guilt unless this Muslim declares that he allows things that are forbidden by God. God willing, Abu-Mus'ab and the young men with him will adhere to this.

Like us, Abu-Mus'ab believes that the blood, honor, and property of Muslims in various Islamic countries are protected by the laws of vendetta. I do not imagine in any event that he will inflict harm on a Muslim soul, property, or honor. I know he is willing to sacrifice his soul, blood, and assets for the cause of his fellow Muslims to bring them out from the darkness of tyrants to the light and justice of Islam. It was a lie when the enemy tried to hold him responsible for an attempt to target thousands of civilians in his country with chemical weapons. This was absolute deception that no one believed. The deep-rooted hatred of the enemy prompted them to tell such a lie against every mujahid concerned about his religion and nation. The enemy told such a lie since they were driven by their loyalty to their American masters, who were jealous of every proud mujahid. Unlike US lackeys, mujahidin refuse to be crushed under the heels of Americans.

From an Islamic jurisprudence perspective, I know that although the man was not an excellent student, he learned God's book (the Koran) by heart in jail. He used to ask many questions about justice. He was ready to sacrifice everything for the sake of integrity. When we were in jail, he believed in my ideology and writings. He did not make any decision without consulting with me in support of tawhid and Abraham's Children. Therefore, I was not surprised when I learned that he named his fighting group in Iraq Jama'ah al-Tawhid wa al-Jihad, albeit without minimum consultation with me. He named his group after my Internet website, which has been known for years as the Minbar (Podium) of al-Tawhid wa al-Jihad. I ask God Almighty that the group will honor its name.

Although Abu-Mus'ab did not adopt our tenets precisely, I was happy when I learned that he became close to Abu-Anas. In the past, Abu-Mus'ab lacked such flexibility, which denied him integration into Al-Qa'ida under Shaykh Usama (Bin Ladin), may God protect him. However, I hope that such flexibility is not the outcome of pressure. Sunnis are supposed to fight and cooperate alongside despotic amirs against infidels. I hope that his rapprochement or elimination decisions are not determined by utter allegiance to him. This is an unbalanced standard that attracts ignorant people who are not qualified for many missions and whose flaws shocked us many times. I hope he does not eliminate virtuous people, each of whom is worth a whole tribe. It is a pity that he does not employ
their expertise. The naivete and limited experience of leading a small group in prison should not affect armed organizational action. We have paid a dear price for this when brothers were either killed or sentenced to life in prison, not to mention the enormous financial losses that were wasted on these hasty experiences.

Honesty, love of the faith, sincerity, and enthusiasm are not enough to enrich an experience and to proceed with an organizational action. They do not replace knowledgeable people. Be aware of arrogance or satisfaction with insignificant or short-lived leadership. Do not undermine the expertise of knowledgeable people merely because they do not agree with you on everything. I know that Abu-Mus'ab does not compromise his faith or the tenets of tawhid. I pray to God that he will not be harmed by his jihadist decisions as a result of the pressure and brutality of the enemy. He should adhere to the straight path in his actions and abstain from exaggeration or negligence.

When it comes to military decisions, Abu-Mus'ab should not excommunicate people in general. He should know that the masses in the country where we live call themselves Muslims. Thus, he should refrain from shedding the blood of Muslims, even if they are sinners or defiant. He should discriminate between fighting in the original home of atheism where the masses are infidels and fighting in the new country of atheism where the masses call themselves Muslims. He should take this into consideration. He should avoid shedding the blood, property, or honor of Muslims, even if they are sinners or defiant. Shedding the blood of people who are protected by the laws of vendetta is a critical dilemma on Judgment Day. It is better to leave a thousand atheists than to shed the blood of one Muslim. We hope he is aware of this.

(Description of Source: London Al-Quds al-Arabi in Arabic -- London-based independent Arab nationalist daily with an anti-US and anti-Saudi editorial line; generally pro-Palestinian, tends to be sympathetic to Bin Ladin)

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Part 7 of Serialized book on Al-Zarqawi and Al-Qa'ida Published
Part 7 of Serialized Book: "Al-Zarqawi . . . The Second Generation of Al-Qa'ida" by Fu'ad Husayn, Jordanian writer and journalist

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When I look at the current widespread chaos in Iraq, I underline what I have already mentioned. The mayhem aims to tarnish the bright image of jihad by means of car bombs, roadside bombs, and mortar bombs in streets and markets packed with Muslims. The pure hands of mujahidin should not be stained by shedding inviolable blood. A fighting group should abstain from such acts. It should respect its jihad and the efforts of its supporters to reap the benefits of jihad. It should not allow itself to commit any of these acts. Its jihad should always be accompanied by responsible words that defend mujahidin and acquit them of disreputable acts.

I have something worthwhile to say. Mujahidin should make the right decisions and stay away from illegitimate acts. They should refrain from overreaction in response to the brutality of tyrants. A warrior should not exceed the legitimate limits. He should abstain from kidnapping or killing people who are Muslims by name under pretexts that they work for infidels in jobs that do not support atheism or antagonism against Muslims. They should abstain from killing or abducting women or children of the enemy since these groups of people are inviolable in Islam. Likewise, mujahidin should not be involved in suicide operations, as some people call them, or martyrdom-seeking operations, as others like to call them. According to our erudite scholars, these actions are called jihadist. We should not ignore the conditions of jihad that our seasoned scholars identified. These known conditions should never be overstepped under pretexts that men are available to carry out such acts, bombs from the deposed regime are readily available, or the country's circumstances provide a suitable environment for chaos. A mujahid can adopt the aforementioned means only when necessary. Beware of exceeding the limits or making such acts a traditional fighting method or an end in itself.

Our ideology of tawhid and Abraham's children is not a reformist call to patch up the situation. Rather, it is a radical call to uproot tyrants and their polytheism. It is a war on their allies. This war is established on redefining adherence or disobedience, love or hate, and cooperation or antagonism. Accordingly, our ideology does not nurture small birds or dervishes. It raises hawks and lions that adhere to the shari'ah and protect the honor and blood of Muslims. Mujahidin should abide by Islamic jurisprudence in favor of the greater Muslim interests and renunciation of corruption. They should choose the most convenient acts and take into consideration the nation's circumstances, the resources of Muslim citizens, and the nature of the phase. Mujahidin should take all this into consideration or else they will rush at fighting without discrimination between good and evil or between the nation's interests and destruction. The acts of ultra extremist groups are fresh in memory. Beware of repeating these acts. Let every mujahid remember that we are adherents of a great religion. Its jihad, objectives, and means are different from those of mafia gangs. The mafia maintains that the end justifies the
means since it is not deterred by faith or shari'ah.

Since financial and responsible human resources are scarce, individuals should take into consideration the situation of the Muslim nation, scholars, and mujahidin in the four corners of the world including free or imprisoned mujahidin. Individuals are not allowed to gamble or waste these resources. They will be accountable before God for wasting their youth and assets. The situation will be graver for those in charge of Muslim lives and resources when God asks them about the age and funds of mujahidin and Muslims. A mujahid, therefore, should opt for actions that are the best for Muslims and their power but most detrimental for the enemy and their atheism. There is no room to experiment or gamble when it comes to the blood of mujahidin and resources of Muslims.

Moreover, beware of expanding the circle of conflict or fighting individuals other than the occupiers and their allied lackeys. Beware of expanding this circle if there is no point behind it or if it dissipates the efforts of mujahidin. Foremost of all, avoid actions that include involvement in unsuccessful plans in countries beyond the locations of mujahidin and their resources. There is no point of revengeful acts that terrify people, provoke the entire world against mujahidin, and prompt the world to fight them or take advantage of the situation to reshuffle the cards or tarnish mujahidin. Mujahidin should refrain from acts that target civilians, churches, or other places of worship including Shiite sites. The battle is against the occupiers and their lackeys, and not against the mosques of Shiites regardless of their history and animosity. Mujahidin should discriminate between Shiite citizens and fighters. In light of the iniquitous crusade and occupation that does not discriminate between Sunnis or Shiites, a declaration of war against sects that call themselves Muslims is not in favor of the shari'ah policy. Mujahidin should abstain from making meaningless threats against countries around the world. Such threats not only aggravate the war but also rally the world against mujahidin. Repetitive threats cost mujahidin their credibility.

Jihad should be accompanied by a mature media that addresses people straightforwardly and informs them of what they do not know -- a media that does not adopt unsuccessful actions that people do not understand. It should avoid tarnishing jihad or discouraging people from following it. The media should take into consideration that people lack knowledge regarding the elite of mujahidin who adhere to Islamic jurisprudence. An individual who does not feel proud about his religion will not do jihad or mujahidin any favor. Rather, he will harm them. God alone knows. The life history of our Prophet Muhammad, prayers and peace be upon him, and his guidance are evident enough. Beware of curtailing jihad or confining it to revengeful reactions. Beware of separating jihad from its concept that builds the nation and enhances its power. Do not focus on the means and forget about the end and do not separate from knowledgeable people or proponents of da'wah.

As a result of the atrocities of Saddam and his party, the Islamic awakening came to Iraq late and was uprooted at various stages. The best thing that mujahidin can offer to this beleaguered country -- if it is not possible to meet great expectations at present -- the best is a pure jihad, right choices, and mature media. This should raise a generation of the country's citizens and tribes that carry one banner and initiate jihad. The people of Mecca know its alleys better, as the saying goes. The country's citizens have the priority to defend their own affairs, discuss their concerns, and shoulder their responsibilities. Mujahidin should pay attention to this issue. It is detrimental if mujahidin do not care about the balance of power in the country or its nature and the nature of its citizens. Strangers should not come first. Mujahidin should not overlook the experiences of our fraternal mujahidin in various countries. I have frequently said that Iraqis should be at the forefront of resistance. A wise Islamic Iraqi leadership that is aware of the concerns of the Iraqi people and knows how to address the people responsibly will become a beacon for the people. It will avoid making dubious decisions or
committing disreputable acts. Mujahidin should take this into consideration if they want to reap the benefits of their jihad in the long run. I ask God Almighty to grant victory to His soldiers and give power to His worshipers.

Finally, during my current term in prison I wrote a book -- observations regarding the dividends of jihad concerning ignorance of shari'ah and ignorance of reality. In it, I included my advice to mujahidin and the proponents of da'wah. I ask God to make every mujahid benefit from my advice and refrain from asking whom I mean by every statement. The issue is greater than this. I have never backstabbed Muslims or sincere and honest mujahidin. My statements address many issues and experiences in various countries and fields. They do not focus on one individual in particular. The book includes experiences of mujahidin and events that came to the surface and drew the attention of people. I advise my fraternal mujahidin to protect their efforts and keep jihad in its brightest image. This is the best victory for them -- better than sacrificing their lives. A well-judged opinion in war is far better than fighting, as the proverb goes.

I hope that readers will find these remarks useful. I published them in support of and as counsel to my fraternal brother Abu-Mus'ab, may God Almighty protect him and grant him success on the path of good guidance. May God grant him and his companions success in favor of tawhid and the pure faith. I hope they listen to the advice. "Allah will certainly aid those who aid his (cause), for verily Allah is full of strength, exalted in might, (able to enforce His will)." (Koranic verse)

Prayers and peace be upon our Prophet Muhammad and his entire family and companions.

(Signed) Abu-Muhammad al-Maqdisi

Qafqafa Prison, Jumada al-Thani 1425, corresponding to July 2004

(Description of Source: London Al-Quds al-Arabi in Arabic -- London-based independent Arab nationalist daily with an anti-US and anti-Saudi editorial line; generally pro-Palestinian, tends to be sympathetic to Bin Ladin)

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After we shed light on Abu-Mus'ab al-Zarqawi's personality at various stages, we opted to have a brief look at Usama Bin Ladin's life. We wanted to shed light on the circumstances that surrounded his ideological development and the difficulties he faced before he established his global front against the United States and the Jews in February 1998. With the establishment of the network, Usama Bin Ladin's concerns in particular and those of Al-Qa'ida in general were not any longer confined to a jihadist group of limited objectives or a specific geographical location. The entire world became a field for the operations of this global organization. Our brief look might clarify subsequent events regarding the importance of the mutual goals of Bin Ladin and Al-Zarqawi in Iraq in 2004 after they once disagreed in 1999. Analysis of the information could help us get an idea of what might happen in the future regarding the development of Al-Qa'ida that began with Usama Bin Ladin's alliance with a Jordanian -- Abdallah Azzam -- and evolved into an alliance with another Jordanian -- Abu-Mus'ab. In between, Bin Ladin had alliances with Al-Zawahiri and Mullah Mohammad Omar during the era of the Taliban Government.

Usama Bin Ladin's family had roots in Hadramawt in Yemen -- the birthplace of the early Arab tribes. It was from there that the Arab exodus began to the peninsula of Arabs -- currently known as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Islamic conquests were later launched after the peninsula's population converted to Islam.

Usama Bin Ladin's father, Muhammad Awad Bin Ladin, arrived in Jeddah from Hadramawt in 1930. He worked as a porter at Jeddah port. Due to his ambition and persistence, Muhammad Bin Ladin became a magnet construction contractor in the kingdom after he was once a porter at the then humble port of Jeddah. The ambition of Usama Bin Ladin's father nurtured his adventurous spirit and gave him courage to introduce himself to King Sa'ud -- the founder of the Saudi kingdom -- as the man capable of handling challenging projects. He succeeded in accomplishing all the projects with which he was entrusted. During that time, he established good relations with members of the ruling family including then Prince Faysal. His relationship with the royal family allowed him to get involved in their private life.

A golden opportunity for Muhammad Bin Ladin came when a dispute emerged between Faysal and Sa'ud. Muhammad Bin Ladin acted quickly and convinced King Sa'ud to abdicate the throne to Faysal. King Sa'ud left with all the funds in the state treasury. As a result, the government faced a severe financial crisis. However, Usama Bin Ladin's father salvaged the government when he secured the salaries of almost all civil servants for nearly six months. To pay back his favor, King Faysal issued a
decree awarding all construction bids to Muhammad Bin Ladin and practically entrusting him with the Ministry of Public Works.

Under such circumstances, Usama Bin Ladin was born in 1957 to a mother originally from Damascus. Usama was the seventh among roughly 50 brothers and sisters. Their father insisted that they all stay in one residence and adhere to religious teachings. In 1969, Muhammad Bin Ladin took care of rebuilding Al-Aqsa Mosque after a fire that erupted there. Earlier, he had contributed to the first expansion of the two holy mosques in Saudi Arabia -- the prophet's mosque in Medina and the holy Ka'bah in Mecca. The Bin Ladin family said they were honored to rebuild the three mosques holiest to Muslims.

Despite his extreme wealth, Usama Bin Ladin's father was religious and modest. At the entrance to his home, he displayed the large basket that he used to carry when he was a porter to express his pride in his own achievements. Usama Bin Ladin's father was killed in a plane crash when he was inspecting the Al-Huda Road project. Usama was 13 years old then. His eldest brother, Salim, took over his father's business. Salim had a strong personality. Several times, he turned down King Fahd's request to become a partner in the giant company that Salim's father had established. However, King Fahd's wish to become a partner of the Bin Ladin family came true after Salim was killed in yet another plane crash.

Since his childhood, Shaykh Usama was brought up in a religious environment. When he was 17 years old he got married for the first time to one of his maternal cousins from Syria. Shaykh Usama completed his elementary and secondary studies in Jeddah. He studied business administration at Jeddah University, where he was introduced to popular Islamic tenets and a number of renowned Islamists. The most prominent of them who had influence on him were Muhammad Qutub, the spiritual father of the Muslim Brotherhood group, and Shaykh Abdallah Azzam, who gave him a course in Islamic culture at the university.

Shaykh Usama Bin Ladin's involvement in Afghanistan began in the early weeks of the Russian invasion of this country. The shaykh was shocked by the occupation of a Muslim country and the expulsion of its citizens by atheist communists. He wanted to have a firsthand look at the situation and therefore, arranged with the Islamic Jama'ah (Group) to go on a trip to Pakistan. The group accompanied him from Karachi to Peshawar. There, he met a number of mujahidin leaders including Sayyaf and Rabbani. Their names sounded familiar to him since some of the mujahidin leaders were guests of his father during the pilgrimage seasons and other occasions. Shaykh Usama kept this trip a secret since he did not know the position of the Saudi Government. He wanted to give his trip an exploratory nature before he made any decision.

Bin Ladin spent a whole month in Pakistan during which he was convinced that the issue deserved his utmost attention. When he returned to the kingdom and felt safe that he could speak about the trip, he began to tell his brothers, relatives, and colleagues at school about what he saw. He embarked on a public relations campaign in favor of mujahidin and raised huge funds that he took with him on his next trip to Pakistan. He accompanied a large number of Pakistanis and Afghans who used to work at the family's company -- the Bin Ladin Company. Shaykh Usama stayed in Pakistan for another month. He traveled there over and over again, each time taking with him donations and a number of people of various nationalities. During these trips, he used to stay in the areas of camps without entering Afghanistan.

In 1982, Shaykh Usama decided to cross the border to Afghanistan to take part in jihad. He saw the
rugged mountainous territory of Afghanistan. Thus, he employed his expertise in construction contracts and brought in a large amount of equipment, bulldozers, and drilling machines to help mujahidin build roads and camps. He made many visits to Afghanistan and supervised the transfer of funds, weapons, and equipment. Every now and then, he participated in some of the battles but on an irregular basis. Shaykh Usama's visits inspired some of the peninsula's population who began to converge on Afghanistan in small numbers. Soon afterward, his campaign became popular. It was organized via liaison offices and camps.

In 1984, Bayt al-Ansar materialized as the first institution of Arab jihad in Afghanistan. It was established as a guest house for newcomers before they headed to training and then to jihad. Despite the establishment of Bayt al-Ansar, Shaykh Usama did not have his own organization, infrastructure of camps, caches of weapons, supplies, or communications. He used to send new recruiters to join warring parties including the parties of Hekmetyar, Sayyaf, or Rabbani.

The establishment of Bayt al-Ansar coincided with the establishment of a services office in Peshawar by Shaykh Abdallah Azzam, May his soul rest in heaven. There was a sort of integration between Bayt al-Ansar and the services office. The latter took care of media and fund-raising issues and urged Muslims, particularly Muslim Arabs, to initiate jihad and sacrifice their soul and property while the former received newcomers and directed those who wanted to participate in jihad or have a firsthand look at the situation of Afghans to the appropriate channels. Shaykh Abdallah and Shaykh Usama became close friends. Both of them believed there was no need to merge their offices since they maintained that it would be better to enhance coordination on several fronts.

In 1986, Bin Ladin decided to expand the jihadist operation and establish camps and supply lines. As a matter of fact, he was able to build six camps. His background in construction contracts enabled him to move these camps more than once in harmony with the circumstances of the war. Subsequently, Usama Bin Ladin entertained the idea of participation in jihad following his experience with establishing camps, adopting Arab mujahidin from the moment they arrived and training them to take part in battles. Young men began to circulate news about the simplicity of the idea of jihad. They dissipated fears of participation in jihad since the man who was in charge of receiving and training them was an Arab.

During this period of time, an enormous number of Arab mujahidin of diverse educational, cultural, and social levels converged on Bayt al-Ansar and various camps. At the beginning, all of them took part in a few clashes but later engaged in ferocious battles. The most famous was the Battle of Gagi at the end of 1986 in which Arab mujahidin defeated trained and heavily armed Russian Army units. A number of elite Russian commandos were killed in the battle. From 1986-1989, Arab mujahidin engaged in five major battles with the Russians and hundreds of minor clashes. It was the best era for mujahidin since the opportunity for jihad became possible without interference from Arab rulers or the Pakistani Government. During this era, Shaykh Usama returned to Saudi Arabia a few times. He spent most of the year in jihad and training in Afghanistan.

Toward the end of the 1980's -- and specifically in 1988 -- Shaykh Usama noticed that he did not keep records of the surging number of the arrivals, departures, battles, casualties, or martyrdoms of Arab mujahidin, although such records were the ABC's of military preparations. The lack of information caused him much embarrassment with families who inquired about their sons by telephone or by sending a delegate to ask about the news of a family member who joined Shaykh Usama. Shaykh Usama realized that the lack of information was not only embarrassing but also a major administrative mistake. Therefore, he decided to reorganize the records of Arab mujahidin.
The idea of records expanded to include full details of everyone who arrived in Afghanistan to join Shaykh Usama's group. The records were arranged in a manner that included the date an individual arrived, the date he joined Bayt al-Ansar, and details of his activities at training camps and on the battlefront. The records were similar to the organizational process of an independent administration. Therefore, there was a need to give it a name to identify it on the local front. Shaykh Usama agreed with his aides to call it the records of Al-Qa'ida (foundation) in view of the fact that it included the whole structure that comprised Bayt al-Ansar, the training camps, and battlefronts. The group affiliated with Shaykh Usama continued to use the name Al-Qa'ida and therefore, the Americans got the impression that it was the name of the organization.

In 1989 and in the aftermath of the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan, Shaykh Usama returned to Saudi Arabia. He thought that, similar to previous trips, he could go back to Afghanistan after he got some business done at home. This time, however, it was different. Soon after his arrival, Shaykh Usama learned that he was banned from traveling. He thought it was in consequence of the Russian withdrawal or an understanding between the major powers and countries in the region.

When Saddam invaded Kuwait, Usama Bin Ladin sent a letter to his country's government in which he explained his opinion regarding the ideal way to protect the country from the Iraqi threat. He made a number of proposals concerning the best means to mobilize the nation against this major threat and the practical methods to deal with it. In addition to these proposals, he offered to bring in all Arab mujahidin under his command in support of the defense plan.

Although he was skeptical regarding the Saudi regime's position vis-a-vis religious and national issues, he expected some sort of positive response for his request to take part in defending the country. However, the state did not take Shaykh Usama's offer into consideration and instead, made a decision that had a major impact on his life. The state decided to call in US forces. This was the biggest shock in his life since, in his opinion, it was the first time in almost 15 centuries that atheists took control of the peninsula of Arabs with their military forces. He was shocked to see US forces entering the country on an invitation from the government that hastily asked for the help of Americans. The US forces did not come as a result of occupation or against the will of the rulers. Following this dangerous development, he became frustrated and concerned about the future of the peninsula. Shaykh Usama realized it was fruitless to address officials by letters. He began to think of alternative means.

(Description of Source: London Al-Quds al-Arabi in Arabic -- London-based independent Arab nationalist daily with an anti-US and anti-Saudi editorial line; generally pro-Palestinian, tends to be sympathetic to Bin Ladin)

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